Between Facts and Possibilities: The Anthropologist as Phenomenologist

An essay discussing how anthropologists read and use phenomenology. Supplementary material on the previous essay about philosophy and anthropology.

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In my earlier post, I briefly alluded to publishing an essay that discusses an example of how anthropologists read philosophers, and vice-versa. This essay is that.

It’s rather theoretically dense, so I do apologize for that. But I’m a lazy turd who cannot be bothered to edit old material, let alone write new material sometimes.

This essay attempts to discuss the anthropological merits of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and at the same time, examine possibilities of an interdisciplinary and syncretic methodology between anthropology and philosophy moving forward, as well as those that already exist. Interdisciplinarity is the future, and any hope of attaining a meaningful position on the job market these days implies as much.

I showed this essay to a very analytic, very scientific phenomenologist I knew and he couldn’t get past the style of prose I employed. He was so hung up on the form that he neglected to give feedback on the essence. Too bad; so sad. I guess this is also something of a litmus test to see how many of my readers swing towards that side of the fence as well?

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https://www.facebook.com/p/Hefty-Heidegger-Memes-100070140679599/

Phenomenology as Methodology

In his lecture, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man, Maurice Merleau-Ponty sets out to elucidate the practical dimensions of phenomenology as a collaborative partner to the empirical sciences. Therein, where he discusses the relationship between phenomenology and history, he discusses the field of anthropology. Merleau-Ponty writes about historicity (Geschlichtlickheit) and its relation to the whole environment (Umwelt), which calls for a joining of the philosophical study of phenomenology and that of anthropology.[1] He argues that anthropology functions as “a mere inventory of actual facts” and phenomenology “a mere thinking through of possible societies,” thereby calling a union between these facts and the phenomenological method—phenomenology must interpret via “animation” and “organization” of the facts that anthropology discovers via the empirical discourse of ethnographic observation, that is to say, the lived experience of those within the context.[2]

To the anthropologist, this raises a few eyebrows. Firstly, there is a distinction between anthropology and philosophy as separate disciplines, each with its own idiosyncratic methodology. The distinction delineates an ideological or intellectual gap not just in goals, but also in method and approach. For Merleau-Ponty, the Umwelt must be expressed vis-à-vis experience, and this expression is grounded on the joint treatment of facts by both the philosophical and anthropological systems working in collaboration. However, therein lies the problem of verifying objective fact—given the prominence of historical (and cultural) relativism, there is a tendency to view the facts of a given Umwelt solely by the merits of its context, independent of any extant objective reality. Indeed, anthropology rests on the assumption that the mere facticity of contextual relativity justifies the existence of their fact. As Merleau-Ponty writes, anthropology—as a positive science—may have the first word in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, but it is unable to obtain the last word, which is to say, verify the objectivity of scientific knowledge nor assign prescriptive notions to what can be done with said knowledge.[3]

This notion of collaboration, the anthropologists may argue, is a false dichotomy. The disagreement rests in the fact that there is ostensibly a mutual exclusivity in both the philosophical discipline and the anthropological science, which many an anthropologist would argue is either nonexistent or altogether irrelevant. The anthropologists would argue instead that phenomenology does not so much belong to philosophy as an institutionalized discipline, but rather exists as a novel methodology for understanding the subjective lived experience of the anthropological subject (known in anthropological jargon as the “collaborator” or “informant”). For the anthropologist, engaging in phenomenology is not so much engaging in philosophy as such, but rather engaging in a discourse of understanding the collaborator to elucidate and bring the structures of subjective experience into objective light. The sensitivity towards the ontological properties of human experience is what is known to anthropologists as the “existential turn,” which follows from the earlier “interpretive turn” that anthropology took wherein participant observation and a more nuanced understanding of cultural relativity came into the fore.[4] [5]

The philosophical direction anthropology took was codified by the work of Michael D. Jackson, an existential anthropologist who primarily worked with Heideggerian themes applied to anthropological practice. His groundbreaking text, the Minima Ethnographica, sought to analyze Dasein relative to interpersonal relationships, using a first-person autobiographical narrative to elucidate the experience of intersubjectivity in various ethnographic frameworks.[6] In recent years, Jackson has steered the direction of the canon of philosophical anthropology away from the subjective experience of Dasein in Heidegger to the ideas of embodied experience found in Merleau-Ponty. However, anthropologists, by and large, use both these thinkers in conjunction with each other, generating idiosyncratic phenomenological narratives of the subjective experience found in their respective ethnographies.[7] Jackson’s work became the cornerstone of the existential turn in anthropology, and it paved the way for phenomenology to be used conjunctively as a methodology for the anthropologist rather than a mutually exclusive philosophical methodology for the philosopher—the anthropologist now became philosopher, and vice-versa.

The synthesis of phenomenology into the anthropologist’s toolkit came from a deep dissatisfaction with the fact that phenomenological discourse began fundamentally outside the subject, as the positionality of bracketing would suggest. It ought to be the case then that analysis and abstraction begin in media res among the processes of experience as such, instead of the products or results of experience.[8] For the anthropologist, phenomenology is a scaffolding for the ethnographic narrative, whose role is to abstract rather than explain subjective lived experience. Through the act of abstraction, phenomenology then preserves the often-necessary element of hierarchization, which is a core component of ethnographic study considering the particularism of cultural relativity.[9] It is necessary to uphold this relativity due to the need for the anthropologist to preserve intersubjectivity in its most subjective form—that of a collaborator’s existential quest for understanding and finding a place within the world. It would not suffice to merely “bracket out” the experiential element in hopes of finding a component of purity hidden deep within the experience as such, but rather, for the anthropologist, the experience constitutes the kernel of meaning. The experience understood mereologically, relies on subjectivity and cultural relativity, which is to be instrumentalized to construct varieties of subjective experience, rather than to be relied on as some heuristic justification as Merleau-Ponty would suggest.

Phenomenology thus has varying degrees of applicability within anthropology, and one can even make the case that anthropology has misunderstood the phenomenological project, which I argue is disingenuous given the diversity of practice and belief among different schools of phenomenology. An agreeable definition and statement of applicability is that phenomenology only exists in anthropology as a theory and method of investigating subjective experience rather than a codified philosophical school of thought.[10] Anthropologists, however, do away with those aspects of phenomenology that appear to be inconducive to the anthropological framework—most radically, there is a necessity to limit the position of phenomenology’s intrinsic affinity towards universalism. Phenomenology insofar as it pertains to universal characteristics must be altered or altogether rejected; the philosophically inclined anthropologist would likely reject it insofar as it sheds presuppositions in a discursive analysis, but it is discouraged to use it to make any claims about the universalistic attributes of any given product or position. For instance, phenomenology should not be used to claim justification through universalism when dealing with positions of powerful subjectivity, such as colonialism; the anthropologist would instead suggest that the universality of phenomenology be limited to basic levels within this exact discourse to shed the presuppositions that come with that (e.g., phenomenology should not be used to justify Heidegger and Nazism, but perhaps it can be used to explain why Heidegger would perhaps view Nazism as a sociopolitical vehicle towards collective authenticity by examining the humanistic pursuit of the ostensible necessity of collective authenticity).[11]

While the phenomenologically inclined anthropologist must tread lightly with phenomenology’s universalistic dimension as a heuristic justification for certain positions, the particularistic dimension has fruitful discursive elements that the anthropologist may use to arrive at insightful and profound observations about their object of study. Phenomenology and anthropology indeed share the same goal of elucidating human generalities via a vis empirical investigations into the concrete, marrying the universalistic and particularistic dimensions of phenomenology into a synthetic analysis methodology.

It must be noted that not all phenomenology gets an equal shake in the anthropological discourse. One is much more likely to see the methodology of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger used more than the likes of Arendt and Sartre, and the latter more than Husserl or Bergson. The anthropological justification for this is that certain phenomenologists have displayed an understanding of the scope of human consciousness relative to experience more so than others, and it is this subjective lived experience being analyzed that interests the anthropologist in phenomenology in the first place.[12] The remaining sections of this paper will then elucidate how anthropologists approach Heidegger, arguably the most cited philosopher in the Western canon of anthropology, alongside Merleau-Ponty.

On Modalities of Being: Reading Heidegger Anthropologically

It is immediately clear to a philosophically knowledgeable reader that the aspect of Heideggerian thought that echoes most profoundly in the anthropological discourse is the notion of Dasein as a formulation of a typology of subjective, idiosyncratic experience. Thanks to the efforts of Michael D. Jackson, the discourse of Dasein has strayed away from an analysis of a mere ontological examination of the self, but rather towards the subjectivity of the Other—the Dasein of the collaborators, or the conceptions and narratives of the self that are found outside oneself. The Jacksonian reading of Heidegger calls into attention the question of that which grounds the social, ethnic, political, religious, moral, and historical dimensions of society—while we may empirically know to a certain extent that societies construct themselves relative to these conceptions, what is there beforehand?[13] This question is important because it necessarily evokes the particularistic dimension of phenomenology, thus straying away from the idea of “fundamental ontology” and instead focusing on “regional ontology” located in Being relative to time, space, and intersubjectivity.[14][15] Thus, one way to interpret this is that there is not so much a focus on being as such, but rather, particular modalities of being—the question of Being is universal, but the mode and understanding of being lends itself to particularities, which can then be used to conclude the universal attributes of Being inductively.[16] This is noted to be an inversion of the initial Heideggerian mission, which states that investigating the fundamental ontology of Being offers insights into the particularity of being.[17] The Heideggerian position posits questions that anthropology may have an answer to. We are thrown into the world without explanation, and there is a fundamental “incompleteness” or “fragmentariness” in Dasein which emphasizes temporality, and as such, this “fragmentariness” finds its end in the death—hence the idea of being-towards-death.[18]

Where does anthropology enter the frame in the Heideggerian discourse, then? Dasein is a premise for establishing the link between the universality of Being and the uniqueness of being.[19] This goes back to the Leibnizian question of “Why is there something rather than nothing?” and the prompt Heideggerian response to this question is to accept the inevitability of death, yet marvel at the fact that there is something there in the first place.[20] Indeed, the idea that there is something rather than nothing is often taken for granted in philosophical discourse, and the mere fact that there is something is an exercise in radical subjectivity, or to use more Heideggerian terminology, authenticity. The idea of death is something often sidestepped insofar as it is some indeterminate end to existence, and its lack of immediate, objective presence in one’s life often deters one from thinking about it. However, for the anthropologist, the mere fact that there is a subliminal reaction to this inevitability manifested in various modes across cultures is something of interest, and the mere facticity and manifestation of any action, even located within specific contexts, is an exercise in a sort of agency. Thus, Sein and Dasein cannot be investigated in isolation in ethnographic contexts, but it must be done relative to instances of arriving at Lichtung.

The importance of Lichtung undergirds the bulk of anthropological discourse surrounding Dasein. For the anthropologist, the notion of Lichtung is the aspect of Heideggerian thought that calls for “a path toward a clearing,” meaning that which is constantly being brought forth and made clear in everyday living.[21] [22] Therein lies the existential kernel of an anthropological analysis of Heidegger, as this manifests in the intersubjective discourses found in the idea of thought, and how thought relates to being. For Heidegger, thought and thinking were productive attributes, compared to dwelling and building—a means of inhabiting the world.[23] Dwelling and building, for Heidegger, are belief-enforced activities that bring about peace despite the anxiety present in being-towards-death, a further example of radical subjectivity.[24] This echoes the Heideggerian notion of Gegnet, and indicates an emphasis on the spatial nature of Being, beyond mere temporality.[25] One then is intuitively drawn at the innate implications of this spatial nature regarding particularity, and the forms in which these implications are manifested are of interest to the anthropologist.

Anthropologists also concern themselves with the varieties in which collaborators of certain cultures arrive at this “Lichtung” and manifest their thoughts in productive activities—indicating the emphasis on Dasein’s temporal, spatial, and intersubjective dimensions. Whether their modes of being are authentic is largely absent in the anthropological discourse insofar as it is explicitly asked or addressed. However, one assumes that, given the setting and acceptance of contextual relativism, this is not so much a relevant question as particular modes of being must be judged on the merit of their specific contexts. Jackson and other anthropologists then use Heidegger not so much as an explicatory framework to analyze subjective experience qua phenomenology methodologically, but rather as a set of existential and phenomenological premises that help elucidate the nature of being in respective settings. Who is to say that the existence of a philosopher is more authentic than that of a rural farmer in an isolated community?

It would be disingenuous, then, to assume that the farmer does not think of the temporality of his being just because he cannot articulate the ontological intricacies of the matter philosophically, but perhaps he is approaching the question differently. Thus, context comes into play in determining the means and methods a farmer uses to exercise his radical subjectivity, given Heidegger’s existential premises.

Becoming as Human Flourishing: New Anthropological Readings of Heidegger

Recent anthropological discourses on Heideggerian philosophy have departed from the question of mere being and have turned towards questions about hope and affirmative action. Anthropologists have noted what is known as a “neo-Aristotelian turn,” wherein Heideggerian phenomenology was synthetically mixed with Aristotelian virtue ethics.[26][27] Anthropologists immediately drew connections between Heideggerian becoming and Aristotelian human flourishing, thus indicating a renewed emphasis on culturally idiosyncratic expressions of human experience. Heidegger thus ceased to become a discourse on being in anthropology but has turned into a discourse of hoping and action, further echoed by the Heideggerian idea that possibilities codify human existence.[28] Thus, one observes that Heidegger in anthropology has been interpretively transformed to be a philosopher of flourishing, which is rather apt considering the preoccupation of anthropology to discuss modes of being rather than being as such in the first place. The Heideggerian Lichtung is not so much a revelation of the nature of being, but the form of human activity—the innate human capacity to bring about something despite nothing, and to engage in intersubjective interaction with certain forms of existence (Vorhandenheit).[29]

Anthropological readings of Heidegger also take some of the problems framed in his premises and look at how individual cultures address said problems. The prevailing Heideggerian problem that anthropology seeks to answer is, rather unsurprisingly, that of anxiety (Stimmung). Given that the Heideggerian human condition is fundamentally “disclosed” (erchlossen), anthropologists know there is a disclosing toward the world and the self, indicating a radical transcendence beyond immediate immanence.[30]

For the anthropologist, this means three things.

Firstly, there is a teleological relation between Stimmung and disclosing, and therein, one finds that this anxiety is the enabler of the possibility of an authentic mode of being. Anthropologists perhaps concern themselves with to what degree a collaborator is aware of this Stimmung and, if he is aware, what methods are employed to alleviate it. Despite its negative connotation, anxiety is not so much a bad thing as it is an enabling factor in arriving at Lichtung wherein one’s authenticity can manifest.

Secondly, there is an emphasis on inductive universality through the distinction of erchlossen. The disclosing toward the world is primarily what anthropologists such as Jackson concerned themselves with, and therein, given the innate property of the human subject to be characterized with possibilities, these possibilities are an avenue to address the innate anxiety borne of disclosing. This may be a reappropriation of Sartre’s claim that the world has “offered itself” to the subject as a field of instrumental possibilities, but the distinction lies in the fact that it is the relation of the subject with the world that has the possibilities as such.[31] Concerning the disclosing towards the self, this must be done in mutuality with the disclosing to the world to enable these possibilities to come about and manifest into actuality. Through this, the subject enables intersubjective interaction with both one and the world around him, delineating a profundity in the lived experience that is both idiosyncratic and likely only to be elucidated through inductive means via phenomenological analysis.

This brings me to the third point—the root and cure to anxiety lies in teleological indeterminacy, which undergirds the act of disclosing as such. The twofold disclosing of the subject enables all action, and thereby, one makes the connection that the way one discloses varies, yet the anxiety following teleological indeterminacy is universally grounded. Thus, there is an emphasized departure from the Cartesian subject and a subliminal rejection that human cognition grounds the totality of subjectivity.[32] This rejection is made clear in the renewed emphasis on intersubjective relations qua innate possibilities within the human subject, and therein lies the task of the Heideggerian anthropologist: how does one ascribe structure and narration into that which is known inductively on an ontologically idiosyncratic level? Perhaps it cannot be fully known or understood, but it can be represented in some way—a seamless coalition of facts and possibilities.

Anthropology as Applied Phenomenology: Towards a Synthetic Union

Attitudes and interpretations of phenomenology’s place in the anthropological discipline are diverse. However, perhaps a more conducive reframing of the positionality will yield a framing of a more productive and synthetic union. Should phenomenology be merely philosophical? Should anthropology be merely scientific? I would argue no. In its various applications in other fields of study, phenomenology has displayed that it lends itself exceptionally well as methodology, particularly in the apprehension of universal constants in the structures of experience. At the same time, anthropology has displayed an aptitude for exercising philosophical abstraction independent of scientistic arrogance, positivistic close-mindedness, and hypernaturalistic dogmatism. Perhaps the relationship between the two disciplines lends itself more to dialectic union rather than dialogic conversation, contrasting Merleau-Ponty’s earlier claim of a subtle opposition. Indeed, due to innate genealogies and ideological goals, the overlap can never be totalistic, but in the spirit of dialecticism, the parts that work are kept, and those that don’t are discarded. Nothing is wrong with this, nor is there anything disingenuous about this conduct. Insofar as the goals and intentions are realized, perhaps it is for the best. Instead of the phenomenologist and anthropologist working in tandem to elucidate a totalistic truth, perhaps the anthropologist should play the part of the phenomenologist and vice-versa to arrive at profundities within their spheres of interest. In the spirit of Heideggerian induction, perhaps these particulars can be used to arrive at conclusions regarding the universal.

The central object of analysis in both phenomenology and anthropology is shared—subjective experience, and there is little need for them to be opposed to each other when the most glaring difference is merely methodology. Although Heidegger claims that anthropology, as an empirical-ontic science, is incapable of founding ontology and tackling philosophy, the application of Heideggerian frameworks in ethnographies suggests otherwise.[33] Heidegger has done little to reflect on the applicability of his framework to situated and contextualized modes of thinking and being, therefore displaying a lack of applicability and objectivity in his ideas. It was left up to the work of Gadamer and Ricoeur to take Heidegger’s framework and apply it to show the propensity towards the universal rather than tell it in theory. Thus, anthropology has not only benefited from phenomenology by being given a novel methodology of understanding the world, but anthropology mutually benefits phenomenology by allotting it a field in which its capabilities and possibilities may be exercised more immediately. Indeed, the phenomenologist is largely reflective, while the anthropologist relies largely on fieldwork amid the presence of their collaborators, but there is an opportunity for a symbiotic benefit herein. The anthropologist exercises phenomenological analysis on varieties of lived experience, thus eliciting a collective boon for both disciplines.

The Frankfurt School philosopher Theodor Adorno said, “Philosophy is no longer applicable to the techniques for mastering one’s life. At the same time, philosophy declared its bankruptcy regarding concrete societal goals by abstaining from all definite content, whether as formal logic and theory of science or as the legend of Being beyond all things.”[34] On the other hand, the anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup says that phenomenology must be at the center of any anthropological endeavor, and it functions as an antidote towards theory fetishism, or that which allows theory to dictate practical knowledge.[35] Despite this burgeoning mutual respect amongst disciplines, perhaps it serves us well to understand that the insights found therein are not mutually exclusive and can lend themselves mutually in a collective search for the truth. This is especially evident in the field of embodied cognition, which seamlessly integrates Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights into ideas found in cognitive science, resulting in a more totalistic and refined understanding of the mental processes of the world.[36] Embodied cognition seems to be not the result of a mere theoretical dialogic interaction between cognitive science and philosophy, but rather a fully realized, synthetic union of two disciplines that retains its novelty and originality. Thereby, a more productive and intellectually conducive union between phenomenology and anthropology won’t arise from a mere dialogue from the positionality of opposition, but perhaps a synthetic union wherein one discipline mutually scaffolds the theoretical shortcomings of the other and reinforces that which is strong. The Merleau-Pontian dichotomy of facts and possibilities then falls short as it seems to delineate a distribution of intellectual labor and responsibility between the two disciplines, when the idealized version of this dialectic union is that phenomenology and anthropology both collect facts and propose possibilities—all in the spirit of collective pursuit towards the truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, Theodor. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Translated by Henry W. Pickford. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Brogan, Walter. Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being. New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2005.

Cavell, Stanley. Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Cobb, William and James M. Edie. (eds.). The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964.

Hastrup, Kirsten. 2004. “Introduction: The Terms of Anthropology.” In Viden om Verden. Edited by Kirsten Hastrup. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2004.

Heidegger, Martin. Discourse on Thinking. Translated by J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966.

—. Poetry, Language, Thought. Translated by Alfred Hofstadter. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1971.

—. (ed.). Basic Writings. London: Routledge, 1993.

—. Being and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.

Hyland, Drew A. and John P. Manoussakis. (eds.). Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Jackson, Michael D. (ed.). Things as They Are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996.

—. Minima Ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the Anthropological Project. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

—. Lifeworlds: Essays in Existential Anthropology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

Jackson, Michael and Albert Piette (eds.). What is Existential Anthropology?. New York, NY: Bergahn Books, 2017.

Ram, Kalpana and Christopher Houston. Phenomenology in Anthropology: A Sense of Perspective. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2015.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Emotions: Outline of a Theory. Translated by Bernard Frectman. n.p., 1948.

Van de Port, Mattijs. Ecstatic Encounters: Brazilian Candomble and the Search for the Really Real. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011.

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[1] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man,” in The Primacy of Perception, eds. William Cobb and James M. Edie, translated by John Wild (Evanston: IL, Northwestern University Press, 1964), 91.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Participant observation is the ethnographic activity of living within the studied community, thereby fully immersing the anthropologist in the contextual milieu of his collaborators. The anthropologist will then live as a member of this community whilst studying it simultaneously, and the dialectic result of the interpretation of lived experiences of both the anthropologist and the collaborators becomes the content of the ethnography.

[5] Michael D. Jackson and Albert Piette, “Anthropology and the Existential Turn,” in What is Existential Anthropology? Edited by Michael D. Jackson and Albert Piette (New York, NY: Bergahn Books, 2017), 1 – 29.

[6] Michael D. Jackson, Minima Ethnographica (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).

[7] Michael D. Jackson (ed.), Things as They Are (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).

[8] Michael D. Jackson, Lifeworlds (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 254.

[9] Ibid. 299.

[10] Kalpana Ram and Christopher Houston, “Introduction,” in Phenomenology in Anthropology, eds. Kalpana Ram and Christopher Houston (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2015), 1.

[11] Ibid. 1 – 2.

[12] Ibid. 4.

[13] Jackson and Piette, “Anthropology and the Existential Turn,” in What is Existential Anthropology?, 24 – 25.

[14] Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: SUNY Press), 10.

[15] Van de Port, Mattijs, Ecstatic Encounters (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 28.

[16] Albert Piette, “Existence, Minimality, and Believing,” in What is Existential Anthropology?, 181.

[17] Heidegger, 1996, 6.

[18] Ibid. 225.

[19] Laurent Denizeau, “Considering Human Existence,” in What is Existential Anthropology?, 215.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid. 224.

[22] Jackson, 2013, xiii.

[23] Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Alfred Hofstadter (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1971) 146 – 151.

[24] Martin Heidegger (ed.), Basic Writings (London: Routledge, 1993), 344 – 363.

[25] Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, translated by J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1966).

[26] Walter Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2005).

[27] Drew A. Hyland and John P. Manoussakis (eds.), Heidegger and the Greeks (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).

[28] Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) 352.

[29] Sverre Raffnsoe, “Empowering Trust in the New,” in Anthropology and Philosophy, edited by Sune Liisberg, Esther Oluffa Pedersen, and Anne Line Dalsgard (New York, NY: Bergahn Books, 2018).

[30] Anders Mose Rasmussen, “Self, Hope, and the Unconditional,” in Anthropology and Philosophy, 230.

[31] Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions, translated by Bernard Frectman (n.p., 1948), 52.

[32] Rasmussen, 230.

[33] Heidegger, 1996, 48.

[34] Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, translated by Henry W. Pickford (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 5 – 6.

[35] Kirsten Hastrup, 2004. “Introduction: The Terms of Anthropology,” in Viden om Verden, edited by Kirsten Hastrup (Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2004), 17.

[36] I confess I know little to nothing about embodied cognition, but I find the field especially fascinating.